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I INTRODUCTION: 
A The Issues: 
This paper concerns a particular aspect of the 
law of procedure with respect to civil and 
criminal litigation. There is one source of 
procedural law about which we know relatively 
little. This is the inherent jurisdiction of the 
court. As the title to this work suggests the 
primary focus will be on the state of the 
inherent jurisdiction in New Zealand. 
The inherent jurisdiction is a residual power 
possessed by the court. Generally it arises 
when the court is faced with some difficulty that 
it cannot satisfactorily deal with using only 
the powers conferred on it by statute or the High 
Court Rules . In such a situation the court 
will appropriate the necessary power citing the 
inherent jurisdiction as the source. However, 
only very rarely will the court describe 
precisely what it perceives the inherent 
jurisdiction to be and what sorts of cases it is 
designed to deal with and then go on to say why 
the case before it is a proper one to be dealt 
with under the inherent jurisdiction. Instead 
the court will usually cite the inherent 
jurisdiction in a rather superficial way as the 
LAW LIBRARY 
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1 
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2 
answer to the problem before it and the judgment 
will draw to a rapid close. A good example of 
this is the case of Donselaar v Mosen 1• The 
facts of this case were as follows. The 
plaintiffs wanted an ex parte order allowing them 
to enter the defendant's premises to seize 
accounting records relating to work done by the 
plaintiff for the defendant on the basis that 
there was a grave risk that the defendant would 
destroy the records when the proceedings were 
served. The plaintiff applied under R478 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure which allowed the Court 
to 
make any order for the detention ... of any 
property which is the subject of the action 
or in respect of which any material question 
may arise in the action. 
The Supreme Court granted the application despite 
the fact that R478 said nothing about ex parte 
orders and also that it was doubtful that the 
wording of R4 7 8 covered the case at all. The 
Court of Appeal upheld the earlier decision not 
on the basis of R478 but on the inherent 
jurisdiction. The Court said simply that, 2 
[1976] 2 NZLR 191. 
Above nl,192. 
3 
we have no doubt at all that the court had 
an inherent jurisdiction to make the 
appropriate order to preserve evidentiary 
material in circumstances such as pertained 
here if that were necessary in the interests 
of justice. 
The result of this case was a sensible one. The 
Court saw that there was a grave risk that the 
defendant would destroy vital evidence and 
thereby neutralise its ability to bring the 
defendant to justice. It looked as if HCR 478 
did not provide the necessary power so the Court 
appropriated the power through the inherent 
jurisdiction. But what we are not specifically 
told is what the inherent jurisdiction is, what 
it is designed to achieve and why the 
circumstances of the case were able to justify 
its intervention with reference to the answers to 
the first two issues. This problem is alluded to 
by I H Jacob 3 who was Master of the Supreme Court 
in England. In 1970 he produced the closest 
IH Jacob "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the 
Court" (1970) 23 CLP 23. 
4 
thing we have to a definitive work on the 
subject. 4 He had this to say: 5 
The inherent jurisdiction of the Court may 
be invoked in an apparently inexhaustible 
variety of circumstances and may be 
exercised in different ways. This peculiar 
concept is indeed so amorphous and 
ubiquitous and so pervasive in its operation 
that it seems to defy the challenge to 
determine its quality and to establish its 
limits. 
In an attempt to meet the challenge mentioned by 
Jacob I propose to focus on three questions. 
First, where does the inherent jurisdiction 
comes from? The more we can discover about its 
origins hopefully the more we will learn about 
what it really is. Second, what it is used to 
achieve? What are its goals? If we can 
The article was used extensively by SA Cohen 
in Due Process of Law (The Carswell Co Ltd, 
Toronto, 1977) and has been cited by the New 
Zealand High Court in King v Blackwood & 
Wayman Unreported, 26 August 1985, High 
Court Auckland Registry A 663/85 and 
Champtaloup v Northern Districts Aero Club 
Inc [1980] 1 NZLR 673 and in the Court of 
Appeal in Taylor v Attorney General [1975) 
2 NZLR 675. 
Above n3. 
B 
5 
discover what purpose(s) the court must have in 
mind before the inherent jurisdiction is 
available to it we will therefore know in what 
types of case the inherent jurisdiction can be 
used. Third, in what circumstances it is 
definitely not available? 
are its limits? 
In other words, what 
These questions will be looked at using two 
vehicles. The first will be a general review of 
the uses to which the inherent jurisdiction is 
put to in New Zealand. The second will be an 
investigation of the question whether the 
District Court possesses an inherent 
jurisdiction. Before this, however, it will be 
helpful to look further at what was said about 
the inherent jurisdiction by Master Jacob in 
1970. 
The Jacob Analysis: 
At this point, the following reservations should 
be made. Jacob provides an English view of the 
inherent jurisdiction. But as we will see 
shortly the inherent jurisdiction is developing 
in an indigenous fashion in New Zealand. The 
main object of this paper is to look at the 
1 
6 
6 
actual cases on the subject decided in New 
Zealand to discover what the inherent 
jurisdiction is. It will be useful to begin 
this work with the Jacobean view so that the 
reader will get a feel for the basic ideas behind 
the inherent jurisdiction. But it must be 
remembered that this view must remain subservient 
to the reality of what the courts in New Zealand 
are actually doing. 
we will proceed. 
With this thought in mind 
The character of the inherent jurisdiction. 
Jacob identified five basic characteristics of 
the inherent jurisdiction: 
(a) It is part of the procedural law, not the 
substantive law and therefore can only be 
invoked in relation to the process of 
litigation. 
(b) It is exercisable by summary process ie . ..__-
without having to wait for a hearing. 6 
( c) It may be invoked in relation to anyone -
whether a party to the proceedings or not 
and in relation to matters that are not at 
issue in the proceedings. 
Jacob described this as the "distinctive and 
basic feature of the inherent 
jurisdiction ... " (above n3,24). 
2 
8 
9 
10 
7 
(d) It is not the same thing as judicial 
discretion. 7 
(e) It is available even if rules of court 
regulate the area in question. These two 
powers are cumulative. The same can be said 
for statute. 8 However the inherent 
jurisdiction can not contravene statute or 
rules of court. 
The history of the inherent jurisdiction. 
The inherent jurisdiction developed along two 
paths, namely, "[b]y way of punishment for 
contempt of court and of its process, and by way 
of regulating the practice of the Court and 
preventing the abuse of its process.". 9 
The power to summarily proceed against and punish 
contempt of court was exercised from the earliest 
times and inherited by the common law judges from 
the practice of the Star Chamber when it was 
abolished in 1641. 10 
Jacob fails to elaborate on this, or explain 
the importance of the distinction . 
Above n3,24. 
Above n3,25. 
Above n3,26. 
11 
So far as regulating court practice 
8 
and 
preventing abuse of process is concerned Lord 
Blackburn put it like this when delivering his 
speech in Metropolitan Bank v Pooley: 11 
But from early times (I rather think, though 
I have not looked at it enough to say, from 
the earliest times) the court had inherently 
in its power the right to see that its 
process was not abused by a proceeding 
without reasonable grounds, so as to be 
vexatious and harassing - the court had a 
right to protect itself against such an 
abuse, but that was not done upon demurrer, 
or upon the record, or upon the verdict of 
a jury or evidence taken in that way, but it 
was done by the court informing its 
conscience upon affidavits, and by a summary 
order to stay the action which was brought 
under such circumstances as to be an abuse 
of the process of the court; and in a proper 
case they did stay the action. 
The inherent jurisdiction is preserved for the 
High Court of New Zealand by the first part of 
(1885) 10 App. Cas.210,220-221. 
,. 
3 
12 
13 
the Judicature Act 1908, s . 16. 
provision reads as follows: 
9 
The entire 
The Court shall continue to have all the 
jurisdiction which it had on the coming into 
operation of this Act and all judicial 
jurisdiction which may be necessary to 
administer the laws of New Zealand. 
The second part of section 16 seems to confer 
even broader powers on the Court, to enable the 
laws of New Zealand to be administered. An 
alternative view is that the words "shall 
I 
continue" al so apply to this second part, and 
that the second part is therefore a description 
of the inherent jurisdiction. 12 I submit that 
this view is not the case as the words of the 
second part are totally inadequate as a 
description of the inherent jurisdiction. 
is evident from all that Jacob had to say. 
This 
The rationale behind the inherent jurisdiction. 
When considering this question Jacob began like 
this: 13 
This was assumed to be the case 
Supreme Court in Re Jones (Deceased) 
2 NZLR 402. 
Above n3,27. 
by the 
[1973) 
14 
15 
This 
10 
The answer is, that the jurisdiction to 
exercise these powers was derived, not from 
any statute or rule of law but from the very 
nature of the Court as a superior court of 
law, and for this reason such jurisdiction 
has been called "inherent". 
description has been said to be 
"metaphysical" 14 which is quite accurate as a 
consideration of the inherent jurisdiction does 
go towards the question of what the real nature 
of the court is. Jacob continues: 
15 
For the essential character of a superior 
court of law necessarily involves that it 
should be invested with a power to maintain 
its authority and to prevent its process 
being obstructed and abused. Such a power 
is intrinsic in a superior court; it is its 
very life blood, its very essence, its 
imminent attribute. Without such a power, 
the court would have form but would lack 
"Civil and Criminal Contempt in the Federal 
Courts" 57 Yale LJ 83,85. The author adds 
(nlS) "the doctrine receives more than 
metaphysical support however, from the 
principle of separation of powers.". 
1 Because of this principle the court must 
have the power to protect its existence and 
authority. 
Above n3,27. 
16 
17 
substance. 
11 
The jurisdiction which is 
inherent in a superior court of law is that 
which enables it to fulfil itself as a court 
of law. 
As authority for this Jacob quotes the classic 
statement of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in 
Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions: 
16 
There can be no doubt that a court which is 
endowed with a particular jurisdiction has 
powers which are necessary to enable it to 
act effectively within such jurisdiction. 
I would regard them as powers which are 
inherent in its jurisdiction. A court must 
enjoy such powers in order to enforce its 
rules of practice and to suppress any abuses 
of its process and to defeat any attempted 
thwarting of its process. 
Jacob then makes his definitive conclusion: 
17 
The juridical basis of this jurisdiction is 
therefore the authority of the judiciary to 
uphold, to protect and to fulfil the 
judicial function of administering justice 
[1964] AC 1254,1301. 
Above n3,27,28. 
12 
according to law in a regular, orderly and 
effective manner. 
C Development in New Zealand: 
1 
18 
19 
As has been mentioned already the inherent 
jurisdiction is developing in an indigenous 
manner. Certainly the Court of Appeal sees the 
New Zealand judiciary as having greater powers 
under the inherent jurisdiction than their United 
Kingdom counterparts. The contrast is strikingly 
shown by comparison of the House of Lords 
decision in Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video 
Information Centre 18 with the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal decision in Busby v Thorn EMI Video 
Programmes Ltd. 19 
Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information 
Centre. 
This case involved a civil action for breach of 
copyright. The defendant was copying the 
plaintiff's video tapes. The plaintiff obtained 
an Anton Piller order allowing it to seize video 
tapes and documents and requiring the defendant 
to disclose who had supplied the pirate cassettes 
and the whereabouts of the master copies. The 
[1981] 2 All ER 76. 
[1984] 1 NZLR 461. 
20 
21 
13 
defendants feared that if they provided the 
documents and information they would be exposed 
to the criminal charge of conspiracy to defraud. 
The House of Lords held that the privilege took 
precedence and that the defendants were not 
required to disclose the evidence. Their 
Lordships did not accept that they had the power 
to declare the evidence admissible in the 
criminal court if the defendants were required to 
disclose it. They felt powerless to interfere 
with the discretion of the Judge in the criminal 
trial. 20 
Their Lordships had another reason for their 
decision. Lord Wilberforce put it like this: 21 
That the civil court has not the power to 
declare evidence inadmissible is strikingly 
shown by s31 of the Theft Act 1968 which 
contains an express provision by which a 
person is obliged to answer questions put in 
proceedings for the recovery of property ... 
Lord Fraser of Tullybel ton said "it can 
hardly be suggested that [ such an order J 
would be effective to prevent ... an English 
criminal court ... from admitting the 
information in evidence at a trial.". 
(Above n18,84). 
Above n18,81. 
2 
22 
14 
and which states that no statement or 
admission so made shall be admissible in 
evidence against the person concerned in 
proceedings for an offence under the Act .... 
The Appellant's submission amounts to a 
request to the courts, by judicial decision, 
to extend this statutory provision to civil 
proceedings generally or at least to these 
proceedings. But this, in my opinion, the 
courts cannot do. 
Busby v Thorn EMI Video Programmes Ltd 
This case had facts very similar to those in 
Rank. The plaintiff obtained an Anton Piller 
order against the defendant which required the 
defendant to disclose information that the 
defendant feared would expose him to the criminal 
charge of conspiracy to defraud. The Court of 
Appeal's solution was simply to hold that the 
defendant had to obey the Anton Piller order and 
that any incriminating evidence disclosed would 
be inadmissible in a criminal court. One of the 
major reasons advanced by Cooke / for not 
following Rank was that, 22 
Above n19,471. 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
15 
A rather wider judicial control over 
criminal trials is recognised in this 
country. It is seen as part of the inherent 
jurisdiction of the Court to prevent abuse 
of process by the avoidance of unfairness. 
He reaches this conclusion by contrasting a 
number of English and New Zealand cases which 
demonstrate that the New Zealand judiciary engage 
in more judicial activism than their English 
counterparts. Two of these contrasts concern 
the inherent jurisdiction. The first is that 
between the English case of Leveller Magazine Ltd 
v Attorney General 23 and the New Zealand case of 
Taylor v Attorney General 24 which deal with the 
inherent jurisdiction of the court to suppress 
the names of witnesses. According to Cooke P 
Taylor established an "apparently wider" 25 
discretion to do so . The second contrast is 
between the English case of R v Sang 26 and the New 
Zealand cases of Police v Lavalle 27 and R v 
[ 197 9) AC 440. 
[1975) 2 NZLR 675. 
Above nl9,471. 
[1980) AC 402. 
[ 1979 J 1 NZLR 45. 
28 
29 
30 
Loughlin. 28 
"show that 
stands at 
16 
Cooke P said the New Zealand cases 
as New Zealand law on entrapment 
present there is a wider judicial 
control over prosecutions than is accepted in 
England under ~ v Sang [ 1980] AC 402. " 29 
One wonders how the New Zealand courts can have 
greater powers under their inherent jurisdiction 
than the United Kingdom courts do if as Jacob 
asserts the courts derive their inherent 
jurisdiction simply from their nature as courts 
of law. 
Somers J dissented claiming that the inherent 
jurisdiction was not as wide as was claimed by 
the majority. The basis for his dissent can be 
summed up in three points: 
1 The privilege against self incrimination is 
a "fundamental cornerstone of our law" . 30 
(1982) 1 NZLR 236. 
Above n25. 
Above n19,481. 
31 
32 
17 
2 Parliament has recognised the privilege and 
specified the circumstances in which it does 
not apply. 31 
3 Therefore to extend those statutory 
provisions to this case would be to "pass 
beyond that which is truly adjudicatory to 
that which is truly legislative". 32 This the 
courts cannot do. 
Before going on we should note two issues raised 
by the Busby decision. The first is that the 
Court of Appeal seems to have seen itself as the 
filler of a gap left by the combination of 
statute and the High Court Rules . However the 
House of Lords and Somers J seemed to say that 
the courts have no power under the inherent 
jurisdiction to fill "gaps", at least not when 
the power is provided in other situations. The 
second issue concerns the limits of the inherent 
jurisdiction. It has always been thought that a 
judge in a criminal trial had an absolute 
discretion as to the evidence admitted at the 
eg. Customs Act 1966,s.297; Insolvency Act 
1967,s.70; Inland Revenue Department Act 
1974,s.18; Companies Act 1955,s.262; 
Merchandise Marks Act 1954,s.24. 
Above n19,482 . 
18 
trial subject to statutory rules. The fact that 
in Busby another court in an entirely separate 
civil proceeding used its inherent jurisdiction 
to fetter that discretion says a lot about the 
potential power stored in that jurisdiction. 
II CLASSIFICATION OF POWERS IN NEW ZEALAND 
When dealing with such a fluid concept it is 
impossible to divide it up into categories and to feel 
totally satisfied with the end result. The 
categories will always overlap. 
is an attempt to do just that 
However the following 
specifically with a 
regard to the ways in which the inherent jurisdiction 
has been recognised and/or used in New Zealand. I 
have used five categories. They are as follows: 
A Ensuring convenience and fairness in legal 
proceedings. 
B Preventing the parties taking steps that would 
render the proceedings useless. 
C Control over persons. 
D Control over inferior courts and tribunals. 
E Preventing abuse of process. 
A Ensuring Convenience and Fairness in Legal 
Proceedings. 
1 
33 
19 
The New Zealand judiciary has appropriated a wide 
range of powers to enable them to control their 
own processes. The majority of them will be 
described briefly but I propose to use as the 
first example of a power under this heading a 
power that was established in a Court of Appeal 
case in which the Court looked at the nature of 
the inherent jurisdiction in an in-depth way. 
This examination resulted in two of the Judges 
coming out with sharply differing views of the 
inherent jurisdiction. By looking at this case 
first, we will be able to see which one of the 
two approaches are followed by the courts when we 
look at the other powers under this heading. 
Power to suppress a witnesses name: 
The power to suppress a witnesses name was used 
in Taylor v Attorney General. 33 The case arose 
from the prosecution of Dr Sutch under the 
Official Secrets Act 1951. 
were members of the New 
Two key witnesses 
Zealand Security 
Intelligence Service, and the Supreme Court used 
its inherent jurisdiction to order that their 
names not be published. Taylor was a reporter 
who breached this order. He was fined for 
contempt of court and he appealed to the Court of 
Above n24. 
34 
35 
Appeal. 
20 
His argument was that the Supreme Court 
had no power to order name suppression. 
The majority of the Court dismissed the appeal. 
The contrast between the opinions of Richmond J 
and the dissenter, Woodhouse J, provides the 
greatest interest. 
Richmond J looked to the will of Parliament as 
expressed in the New Zealand Security 
Intelligence Service Act 1969 that the Service be 
allowed to effectively protect national security. 
According to him the "interests of justice, as 
a continuing process, required the effectiveness 
of the service to be preserved." 34 Richmond J was 
certainly looking a long way ahead in his search 
for how he could establish that the order in 
question promoted the interests of justice . What 
he was saying was that the order would preserve 
an effective SIS, which would then be able to 
freely prevent some of the unjust activities 
going on in New Zealand. His other explanation 
of how the order promoted the interests of 
justice was as follows: 35 
Above n24,684. 
Above n24,684. 
36 
21 
It is, I think, in accordance with the 
requirements of justice that the Courts 
should be able to give members of the 
service a limited degree of protection when 
they are called on to give evidence at a 
trial under the Official Secrets Act 1951 
which, in the interests of justice being 
administered in public, is held in open 
Court rather than in camera. 
Here Richmond J was really talking about fairness 
to the witnesses although he called it a 
requirement of justice. His analysis comes down 
to the proposition that the inherent jurisdiction 
is available whenever "justice" in the widest 
possible sense of the word would be promoted by 
its exercise. 
However he also made it clear that the Court 
could not have made such an order if the officers 
had not been involved in the trial. The Court 
has no general power to uphold the will of 
Parliament in a situation unrelated to 
proceedings before it. 36 
The appellant argued that certain statutory 
provisions excluded the inherent jurisdiction. 
Above n24,684. 
37 
38 
39 
22 
Richmond J considered only the Criminal Justice 
Act 1954, s. 46 ( 1) which empowered the Court to 
suppress the name of any "person connected with 
the proceedings". He said such a provision does 
not abrogate an " [ i] nherent power of the Court 
unless the statutory provision is in some way 
repugnant to the continued existence of this 
statutory power ... 11 • 37 Instead he considered 
that section 4 6 provided an "al terna ti ve remedy 11 38 
only. 
His Honour also attempted to conceptualise the 
inherent jurisdiction by contrasting it to the 
general jurisdiction of the court: 39 
When the word "jurisdiction" is used in 
relation to Courts of Justice what is 
ordinarily meant is the authority which a 
Court has to decide matters that are 
litigated before it or to take cognisance of 
matters presented in a formal way for its 
decision: 9 Halsburys Laws of England ( 3rd 
ed)p350 .... But when one speaks of the 
inherent jurisdiction of the Court to make 
Above n24,687. 
Above n 24,687. 
Above n24,681,68 2 . 
40 
23 
orders of the kind now in question the 
problem really becomes one of powers 
ancillary to the exercise by the Court of 
the jurisdiction in the primary sense just 
described. Many such ancillary powers are 
conferred by statute or by rule of Court, 
but insofar as they are not inferred then 
they can only exist because they are 
necessary to enable the Courts to act 
effectively within their jurisdiction in the 
primary sense. 
As authority for this statement Richmond J cited 
the classic quote of Lord Morris in Connelly v 
Director of Public Prosecutions 40 • 
Woodhouse J dissented adopting a more restrictive 
view of the inherent jurisdiction. He had three 
reasons for his decision. First section 46 of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1954 which has already 
been mentioned excludes the inherent 
jurisdiction. His Honour considered this section 
to be a total substitution for the inherent 
jurisdiction so far as it extended. Therefore 
because the order in question could have been 
made under section 46 it could not be made under 
Above n16. 
41 
42 
24 
the inherent jurisdiction. An interesting point 
was also made about section 375 of the Crimes Act 
1961 which provides for a prohibition on the 
publication of the evidence adduced in a trial. 
This provision was seen as wider than the 
inherent jurisdiction because it can operate on 
the grounds of public morality. 
Second, the order was worded too widely. Most 
people would think it was attempting to preserve 
the secrecy of the witnesses identities as SIS 
agents irrespective of whether the information 
communicated concerned the proceedings in Court. 41 
Richmond J did not talk about the wording of the 
order but if he had interpreted it in the same 
way as Woodhouse J we have seen that he would 
also have decided that it was too wide to be 
supported by the inherent jurisdiction. 42 
Third, and for us most significantly, even if the 
order had been worded narrowly enough the 
inherent jurisdiction would not support it. He 
Above n24,690. 
Above n24,684. 
43 
25 
noted that the order attempted to exert control 
over the general public. He continued: 43 
That sort of judicial power could not be 
used for purposes of individual or group 
convenience or even for the public interest 
in general. Instead as one experienced 
officer of the Court in England has said, 
"The juridical basis of [the inherent] 
jurisdiction is ... the authority of the 
judiciary to uphold, to protect and to 
fulfil the judicial function of 
administering justice according to law in a 
regular, orderly and effective manner: 
Master Jacob, 'The Inherent Jurisdiction of 
the Court', Current Legal Problems 1970 
23,27-28.". Thus it is the due 
administration of justice - at the time and 
not for the future - that is the concern and 
province of the Court: not the personal but 
extraneous problem that may face the 
individual litigant witness or judge in some 
particular case. Keeping the identity of f 
the witnesses secret had no effect on 
whether or not justice was done in the trial 
of Dr Sutch. Therefore an order to that 
Above n24,689. 
26 
effect could not be supported by the 
inherent jurisdiction. 
Thus we have our contrast. According to 
Woodhouse J, the inherent jurisdiction is only 
available to ensure a just resolution of the 
dispute before the court. But according to 
Richmond J it is available whenever its exercise 
would promote the "interests of justice" in the 
broadest possible sense of that term. The 
approach of Woodhouse J is the narrower one so we 
may safely assume that any purported exercise of 
inherent jurisdiction that complies with this 
approach is indeed a proper exercise of inherent 
jurisdiction. However, purported exercises of 
inherent jurisdiction that do not fall within the 
scope of the Woodhouse J formulation, but that 
need to be justified on the broader approach of 
Richmond J are the ones that may provoke the most 
thought as to whether they are proper exercises 
of inherent jurisdiction. Both Judges agree 
however that what the inherent jurisdiction is 
all about is bringing about justice. We will 
now go on to see whether that is the case, and 
which of the two Judges came closest to 
describing the role of the inherent jurisdiction. 
2 
27 
Ordering further particulars. 
The power to order further particulars of the 
cause of action from the plaintiff or of the 
grounds of defence from the defendant on its own 
motion was recognised in an obiter statement by 
the Supreme Court in 1901 in Hickson v Scales. 44 
This power, being designed to allow both parties 
to be adequately prepared for the hearing, has as 
its aim a just result in the proceedings before 
the court and therefore satisfies the test of 
Woodhouse J. 
3 Altering a judgment. 
44 
45 
46 
The power of a court to change an oral judgment 
until the judgment is perfected by being drawn up 
and sealed was used by the Supreme Court in 
Hickford v Tamaki 45 and recognised in Re A' s 
Application for Legal Aid. 46 This power is also 
designed to allow justice to be done in the 
particular proceedings before the court and 
therefore satisfies the test of Woodhouse J. 
(1901) 19 NZLR 202,206. 
[1962] NZLR 786. 
[1973] 2 NZLR 444. 
4 
47 
28 
Granting letters of administration. 
In the case of Re Jones (Deceased) 47 the only two 
people entitled to letters of administration over 
the deceased's estate by the Administration Act 
1969,s.6 were unwilling to administer the estate. 
They both consented to the deceased' s brother 
being granted letters of 
Supreme Court held that 
administration. The 
under its inherent 
jurisdiction pursuant to the Judicature Act 
1908,s.16 which conferred upon it the power 
"which may be necessary to administer the laws of 
New Zealand" the application by the brother could 
be granted. The tests of Woodhouse J and 
Richmond J are irrelevant to this power because 
it is not related to the process of litigation, 
although it is a matter of procedure in that the 
decision did not affect any substantive rights. 
However, this case was decided under the second 
part of section 16, which as we have seen, may 
mean that the case had nothing to do with the 
inherent jurisdiction. 
(1973] 2 NZLR 402. 
5 
6 
48 
49 
50 
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Giving a party more time. 
In Champtaloup v Northern Districts Aero Club 
Inc 48 the plaintiff's time limit for bringing the 
action had elapsed, but the Court granted an 
extension because that was the just thing to do 
in the circumstances. 49 This decision allowed a 
just claim to be pursued and therefore the 
exercise of inherent jurisdiction in this case 
satisfied the test of Woodhouse J. 
Ordering security for costs 50 
In Wilkinson v Johnston 51 the Supreme Court 
ordered security for costs against the plaintiff 
even though R541 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
which at the time governed the awarding of 
security for costs did not apply. The Court did 
this because in the circumstances (the plaintiff 
was an undischarged bankrupt) it was "right that 
[1980) 1 NZLR 673. 
Today the same result could be reached using 
High Court Rule 6 which is wider than the 
former Rule 594 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. 
The awarding of security for costs is now 
governed by HCR 60. 
(1889) 7 NZLR 369. 
7 
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security should be given". 52 It is hard to see 
how the awarding of security for costs could have 
helped to bring about a just result in this case 
and therefore it would not satisfy the test of 
Woodhouse J. It could be justified using the 
ideas of fairness of Richmond Jin that it would 
have discouraged the plaintiff from bringing an 
unmeritorious case, thereby saving the defendant 
all the trouble and expense of defending the 
action. 
Setting aside null judgments. 
The power of the Court of Appeal to set aside a 
judgment of its own that is for some reason a 
nullity was recognised in an obiter statement in 
R v Nakhla (No.2). 53 This power satisfies the 
test of Woodhouse J as it aims at bringing about 
a just result of the proceeding before the court. 
8 Allowing non-qualified advocates to appear. 
52 
53 
54 
This power was recognised in Re GJ Mannix Ltd 54 
but was not e x tended to the particular litigant 
in question. It was thought that the power could 
Above nSl,372. 
[1974] 1 NZLR 453. 
[1984] 1 NZLR 309. 
9 
55 
56 
57 
58 
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be exercised when there was an emergency and 
counsel was unavailable or when the matter was 
straight forward or in other situations where an 
insistence on qualified counsel would be "unduly 
technical or burdensome". 55 This power would 
only satisfy the test of Richmond J as the issue 
is merely fairness to one of the parties. Its 
exercise would do nothing to bring about a just 
resolution of the actual dispute unless counsel 
could not be obtained at all. 
Correcting the court record 56 
Twice the inherent power of the District Court to 
do this without the need for any application from 
the aggrieved party has been affirmed on appeal. 
In Salaman v Chesson 57 an extra conviction was 
mistakenly entered against the accused. The 
Magistrate deleted the conviction from the record 
when the mistake was discovered. The District 
Court Judge in Rol ton v Seeman 58 corrected an 
incorrectly recorded sentence. This power is 
Above n54,314 . 
This power is additional to the power 
contained in HCR 12 to correct an accidental 
slip or omission in any judgment or order. 
(1926] NZLR 626. 
(1982] 1 NZLR 60. 
10 
32 
obviously justifiable under the approach of 
Woodhouse J. 
Holding a hearing in camera 
The leading case is that of Scott v Scott. 59 The 
House of Lords made it clear that the ground for 
granting an in camera hearing was the aim of 
justice in the particular case. Therefore this 
power is definitely supportable by the inherent 
jurisdiction. This case is fully accepted in 
New Zealand as is apparent in Taylor v Attorney 
General. 60 
11 Consolidating proceedings. 
59 
60 
61 
This power was used in Clark v Sutton; Christy v 
Sutton. 61 In that case there had been a road 
accident with two people being injured by the 
same person. They filed separate actions 
against that person. The Court consolidated the 
proceedings to save the expense and delay 
involved in two separate trials and also to stop 
the oppression which would be suffered by the 
defendant. This decision had nothing to do with 
(1913] AC 417. 
Above n24. 
(1960] NZLR 829. 
12 
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63 
33 
the bringing about of a just resolution of the 
disputes, but rather with the broader principles 
of fairness. The same power was used in 
McKnight v Davis; Davis v McKnight 62 where the 
parties had been involved in a car collision with 
each other and they both filed suits against the 
other . The mechanism of a counterclaim was 
unavailable. This time the court was primarily 
concerned with obtaining the just result 
therefore meaning that the inherent jurisdiction 
could definitely support the action the Court 
took. 
Making rules of court 
That this power is vested in the judges of the 
High Court of England was recognised in Connelly 
v Director of Public Prosecutions. 63 This power 
is also expressed in the form of Practice Notes. 
These are issued by the High Court and Court of 
Appeal. The most well known one is probably the 
one made by the House of Lords which announced 
that the House would no longer consider itself 
[1968) NZLR 1164. 
[1964] AC 1254. 
13 
64 
65 
66 
67 
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bound by its own judgments. 64 Practice Notes do 
not have the force of law, 65 but if they are not 
complied with the court can stay or dismiss the 
proceedings, impose conditions or make orders for 
the payment of costs. 66 Here the inherent 
jurisdiction is being used in a legislative 
manner, not as part of the process of litigation, 
therefore Richmond J would say Practice Notes are 
not supportable by the inherent jurisdiction. 
Setting aside consent orders. 
The power of the court to set aside a sealed 
consent order in the interests of justice was 
recognised by the Court of Appeal in Waitemata 
City Council v MacKenzie. 67 According to the High 
Court in Jones v Borrin 68 this jurisdiction may be 
exercised in four situations: 
Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) 
[ 196 6 ] 1 WLR 12 3 4 . 
Birmingham Citizens Permanent Building 
Society v Caunt (1962] Ch.882; London 
Permanent Benefit Building Society v De Baer 
(1968] 2 WLR 465. 
E Campbell Rules of Court (The Law Book Co, 
Sydney,1985),42. 
(1988] 2 NZLR 242. 
Unreported, 21 August 1989, High Court 
Auckland Registry M54 / 86. 
69 
70 
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i) The order is based on a mistake made by the 
court. 
ii) The order is based on a mistake by both 
parties. 
iii) The order was consented to by counsel 
without the authority of the client. 
iv) The order was based on a unilateral mistake 
by one of the parties. 
This power is designed to bring about a just 
result in the dispute before the court and 
therefore the inherent jurisdiction definitely 
supports this power. 
Conclusion 
At this point we must ask what light this summary 
has shed on the questions we asked initially. 
The New Zealand judiciary has asserted a wide 
range of powers. 69 They can certainly be 
exercised on the basis that the justice of the 
case requires it for that is the test of 
Woodhouse J in Taylor v Attorney General 
70 who 
These powers are in addition to HCR 9 which 
says that when a case arises that the rules 
have not provided for at all the Court shall 
deal with the case according to any rules 
affecting a similar case, or if there are no 
such rules, in the manner that will best 
promote the interests of justice. 
Above n24. 
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took the most restrictive view of the inherent 
jurisdiction. However, the powers to suppress 
witnesses names, to grant letters of 
administration, to order security for costs, to 
allow non-qualified advocates to appear, to 
consolidate proceedings and to make rules of 
court all seem to be based on wider ideas of 
convenience, fairness and efficiency in the 
administration of justice in line with the 
approach of Richmond J. This approach has the 
disadvantage that it renders the inherent 
jurisdiction a vague concept without easily 
definable limits. This is convenient for judges 
who want to be able to justify anything they do 
under the inherent jurisdiction. However this 
may be a dangerous state of affairs because as we 
saw in Busby v Thorn EMI Video Programmes Ltd 
71 
there is a tremendous amount of power stored in 
the inherent jurisdiction. Having said that I 
submit that no action taken under the inherent 
jurisdiction that we have examined in this 
section has been unreasonable. The inherent 
jurisdiction has been exercised in a controlled 
and sensible manner. This is fine while we have 
a judiciary who act responsibly, but if the day 
Above nl9. 
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comes when that is not the case we will want to 
have an inherent jurisdiction with real limits. 
This is certainly not the case today, under this 
heading at least. 
Preventing the Parties Taking Steps that Would 
Render the Proceedings Useless. 
The courts have developed two remedies to prevent 
the defendant in the proceedings neutralising the 
court's ability to enforce the substantive rights 
of the plaintiff, both of which have a drastic 
effect on the defendant. They have both 
attracted considerable notoriety . They are the 
Anton Piller order and the Mareva injunction. 
1 Anton Piller orders 72 
This remedy is designed to meet the 
situation where the prospective defendant is 
holding vital evidence that it could easily 
destroy if it realised that proceedings 
against it were being considered. The order 
can be obtained ex parte which is its most 
valuable feature . It compels the defendant 
to allow the plaintiff to search its 
premises for documents and articles and it 
Equivalent remedies are provided by High 
Court Rules 331 and 322. 
73 
74 
75 
38 
can also require the defendant to provide 
certain information. 73 Failure to comply 
with the order is a contempt of court. 
As we saw in the introduction, the order was 
first made in Donselaar v Mosen. 
74 It is a 
controversial remedy and is seen in some 
quarters as "a rather draconian device for 
use in a civil case.". 75 There is a strong 
argument that the courts usurped 
Parliament's sovereign law making power by 
creating the order. Parliament had 
specifically created such a remedy for the 
criminal law, namely the search warrant. 
When doing so it was also able to specify 
the preconditions to the granting of one and 
The order considered in Busby ( above nl 9) 
was in these terms. However the power to 
extract information may not be traceable to 
the inherent jurisdiction. Cooke Pat p466 
considered that this power came from the 
courts equitable jurisdiction to order 
interrogatories. 
Above nl. 
Hon. J K McLay in a speech to the Record & 
Video Association, 25 March 1983. The 
potential danger in such orders has been 
noted with concern by other authors eg. A 
Staines "Protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights: Anton Piller Orders" (1983) 46 MLR 
274; J E Hodder, 'National Business 
Review', 13 June 1983. 
76 
39 
the safeguards to be observed in its 
exercise. Parliament did not create such a 
device for the civil law but the courts have 
taken it upon themselves to create it and in 
doing so have made themselves the arbiters 
of the preconditions and safeguards to be 
observed with the result that the 
preconditions and safeguards are being 
developed on a case by case basis, which is 
much less satisfactory than legislation 
because the law becomes less certain. This 
this 
the 
is an especially 
sort of area, 
strong 
which 
argument in 
deals with 
curtailment 
liberties. 
of people's individual 
However I submit that this is 
a proper role for the inherent jurisdiction. 
The court should not have to stand back and 
watch its process being thwarted because 
Parliament has for some reason not provided 
the power required. The Court in Donselaar 
v Mosen 76 saw that the defendant was likely 
to attempt to evade the course of justice so 
it acted to prevent this. Such action is 
definitely supportable by the inherent 
jurisdiction. The problem that arises is 
Above nl. 
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that we must rely on the judiciary to grant 
Anton Piller orders responsibly, and to 
impose appropriate safeguards. If we find 
they cannot be so relied upon, specific 
legislation curtailing the use of Anton 
Piller orders will be necessary. 
2 Mareva injunctions 
This remedy is designed to meet the 
situation where there is a real danger that 
the defendant may remove all its assets from 
the jurisdiction of the court to another 
country and/or dissipate the assets within 
the jurisdiction. The injunction freezes 
the major assets of the defendant and again 
its value is found in the fact that it can 
be obtained ex parte. The jurisdiction to 
grant a Mareva injunction was confirmed in 
Hunt v BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd. 
77 The 
Court of Appeal based its decision upon the 
Judicature Act 1908,s.16 which we have 
already examined. In 1982 the Court of 
Appeal of New South Wales was of the opinion 
that the Court in Hunt was in effect basing 
(1980] 1 NZLR 104. See also Wilsons (NZ) 
Portland Cement Ltd v Gatx-Fuller 
Australasia Pty Ltd (1985] 2 NZLR 11. 
78 
79 
80 
81 
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its decision on the inherent jurisdiction. 
78 
The effect of a Mareva injunction is often 
drastic for the defendant. When one is 
granted the defendant must apply to the 
court to be able to deal with it's assets in 
any way and may have to disclose their 
whereabouts. 79 The court can order 
discovery and interrogatories against the 
defendant 80 and can order cross-examination 
of the defendant on affidavits filed in 
purported compliance with a discovery order 
made ancillary to a Mareva injunction. 
81 
Mareva injunctions have even been granted in 
conjunction with Anton Piller orders.
82 It 
is apparent from this brief summary that 
Mareva injunctions can be oppressive to the 
defendant to say the least. However, I 
Riley McKay Pty Ltd v McKay (1982] 1 NSWLR 
264. 
PCW (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd v Dickson 
(1983] 2 All ER 158. 
A v C (1981] QB 956. 
Campbell Mussels v Thompson (1984) 87 LS Gaz 
2140; House of Spring Gardens Ltd v Waite 
(1985] FSR 173. 
CBS United Kingdom Ltd v Lambert [ 1982] 3 
All ER 237; Johnson v L & A Philatelies Ltd 
[1981] FSR 286. 
42 
submit that they are as justifiable under 
the inherent jurisdiction as Anton Piller 
orders are. The Court in Hunt 
83 was faced 
with the danger that the defendant, a 
wealthy man with assets in many countries, 
was easily able to remove all his assets out 
of its jurisdiction. By granting a Mareva 
injunction, the Court ensured that the 
defendant would not be able to escape his 
legal liability. Therefore a just result 
was secured in the proceedings before the 
Court making the decision definitely 
supportable by the inherent jurisdiction. 
Again, our only problem is that we must rely 
on the judiciary to lay down the appropriate 
preconditions to the granting of a Mareva 
injunction and the safeguards to be observed 
in its exercise. 
C Control Over Persons: 
83 
There are two principal powers under this 
heading. 
Above n77. 
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Power over officers of the court: 
This power was described by Jacob
84 as a very 
broad one being held over lawyers, receivers, 
sequestrators, bailiffs, jurors and witnesses. 
The power also allows the court to punish any 
person hindering those officers in the execution 
of their duty as a contempt of court. In New 
Zealand this power manifested itself in Re C(A 
Solicitor) 85 where the High Court ordered a lawyer 
to honour an undertaking made in anticipation of 
the possibility of court proceedings. This 
decision severely tests the principle that the 
inherent jurisdiction moves in the realm of the 
procedural law only as proceedings had not yet 
officially begun and were by no means certain to 
occur. The decision is analogous to the 
enforcement of a contractual promise which takes 
us into the substantive law. 
Above n3,46. 
[1982] 1 NZLR 137. 
2 
44 
Wardship: 
The High Court has an inherent jurisdiction to 
protect all minors within its jurisdiction. 
86 
The classic scenario for its operation is the 
case of a child that is being mistreated by its 
natural parents. On an application for wardship 
being made to the High Court the Court can take 
the child from its natural parents and appoint 
foster parents. The High Court has overall 
responsibility for the child from that point on. 
Again it is very hard to see how this power can 
be justified on a procedural basis because its 
exercise has nothing to do with the process of 
litigation. We now seem to have two exceptions 
to our idea of a "procedural only" inherent 
jurisdiction. 
D Control Over Inferior Courts and Tribunals: 
86 
87 
An "inferior court" is any court with 
jurisdiction inferior to that of the High Court. 
87 
This jurisdiction of the High Court over inferior 
courts is best illustrated in the field of 
Chapman v Chapman (1954) AC 429; In re P 
(Infants) [1967) 1 WLR 818. 
Judicature Act 1908, s . 2. 
88 
89 
90 
45 
contempt of court. The general rule is that an 
inferior court can punish the offender for 
contempt committed in the face of the court but 
only the High Court can punish for contempt of 
the inferior court committed outside of the 
inferior court. 88 Thus in Quality Pizzas Ltd v 
Canterbury Hotel Employees Industrial Union
89 the 
Court of Appeal held that the High Court had the 
power to punish a company for its refusal to 
comply with an order of the Arbitration Court by 
sequestration of its assets. This went beyond 
the powers given to the Supreme Court by the Code 
of Civil Procedure in two ways. First the Code 
did not provide the for punishment of a company. 
Second, the Code did not provide the power of 
sequestration. 90 The result of this case is 
definitely justifiable under the inherent 
jurisdiction as the Supreme Court was enforcing 
what the Arbitration Court had deemed to be the 
just result in the proceedings. An analysis of 
the entire area of contempt of court may reveal 
powers that are more difficult to justify under 
_g v Lefroy (1873) 8 QB 134. 
[ 1983] NZLR 612. 
Today HCR 610 provides the power of 
sequestration. 
E 
1 
91 
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the inherent jurisdiction. Such an analysis is 
however beyond the scope of this paper. 
The High Court also has the power to set aside 
consent orders made in inferior courts which were 
induced by mistake. This was the situation in 
Jones v Borrin 91 which we have already looked at. 
This section shows that inferior courts have less 
inherent jurisdiction than the High Court in 
certain areas. This observation raises the 
question we will examine in detail later, namely 
whether the inherent jurisdiction is possessed 
by the District Court. 
Preventing Abuse of Process: 
This is a power often used in criminal trials. 
Therefore we will examine the civil and criminal 
jurisdictions separately for the purposes of 
clarity even though there may be no logical 
compulsion to do so. 
Civil litigation: 
As early as 1841 Alderson Bin Cocker v Tempest
92 
was of the opinion that: 
Above n68. 
(1841) 7 M & W 502,503-504; 151 ER 864,865. 
93 
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The power of each Court over its own 
processes is unlimited; it is a power 
incident to all Courts, inferior as well as 
superior; were it not so, the Court would 
be obliged to sit still and see its own 
process abused for the purpose of injustice. 
The modern authorities are also quite clear that 
this power is possessed by inferior courts as 
well as superior courts. 9
3 
Today High Court Rule 186 provides as follows: 
Without prejudice to the inherent 
jurisdiction of the Court in that regard, 
where a pleading -
(a) discloses no reasonable cause of 
action or defence or other case 
appropriate to the nature of the 
pleading; or 
Hunter v Chief Constable of the West 
Midlands Police (1982] AC 529,536 per Lord 
Diplock; Mills v Cooper (1967] 2 QB 459,467 
per Lord Parker CJ; McMenamin v Attorney 
General (1985] 2 NZLR 274,276 per Somers J; 
Rourke v The Queen (1987) 76 DLR (3d) 
193,206 per Laskin CJC, approved in Moevao 
v Department of Labour [1980] 1 NZLR 464,476 
and also in Bryant v Collector of Customs 
(1984] 1 NZLR 280,284. 
94 
95 
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( b) is likely to cause prejudice, 
embarrassment, or delay in the 
proceeding; or 
( C) is otherwise an abuse of the 
process of the Court, -
the Court may at any stage of the proceeding 
on such terms as it thinks fit order that 
the whole or any part of the pleading be 
struck out. 
The power to dismiss or stay proceedings 
summarily on basically the same grounds 
94 is 
contained in HCR 477. 
Rule 186 is obviously intended to be an 
alternative remedy to the inherent jurisdiction 
the classic formulation of which is that the 
court can strike out a pleading that discloses no 
cause of action or that is frivolous, vexatious 
and an abuse of the process of the court. 
95 It 
seems that the difference between R186 and the 
inherent jurisdiction is "more apparent than 
It has been stated that the differences 
between Rules 186 and 477 are more apparent 
than real: R A McGechan High Court Rules 
(Booker & Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1988) para 
477.04 (1). 
Reichel v Magrath (1889) 14 App.Cas.665. 
96 
97 
98 
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real". 96 The rule suggests that it can be used 
fairly often but it has been judicially stated 
that the rule can only be used sparingly and in 
a clear case because that was the practice under 
the inherent jurisdiction. 
97 We shall now look 
at each ground of dismissal contained in R186. 
(a) No reasonable cause of action defence or 
other case . 
This power can only be exercised where the 
case is "so clearly untenable that [it J 
cannot possibly succeed.". 98 However this 
does not have to be immediately obvious. 
Determining whether the case can possibly 
succeed may require extensive argument. 
99 
This ground has been used by the Court of 
Appeal to strike out actions under the 
R A McGechan High Court Rules ( Booker & 
Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1988) para 
186 . 04 ( 1) . 
MacKenzie v Waitemata City Council 
Unreported, 1 7 June 19 8 6, High Court 
Auckland Registry CP123/86, p8. 
Takaro Properties v Rowling (1978] 2 NZLR 
314,317. 
Gartside v Sheffield Young [1983] NZLR 
37,45. 
100 
101 
102 
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inherent jurisdiction without mentioning 
R186. 100 
(b) Prejudice embarrassment or delay 
Such problems may be caused by a party 
attempting to plead evidence (as opposed to 
facts and issue which is what should be 
pleaded). 101 Such problems may also be caused 
when irrelevant material is pleaded. 
102 
(c) Abuse of process 
This is the miscellaneous category. The 
words II is otherwise" show that the 
circumstances contemplated in paragraphs (a) 
and (b) are also an abuse of process. This 
category has expressed itself most often in 
the dismissal of attempts to relitigate 
matters that have already been determined. 
When substantially the same action is 
brought for a second time the plea of res 
judicata is available and is a conclusive 
New Zealand Social Credit Political League 
v O'Brien [1984] 1 NZLR 84; Reid v New 
Zealand Trotting Conference [1984_]_1-NZLRs":"" 
Meikle v New Zealand Times Co (1904) 23 NZLR 
893; Public Trustee v McArley [1942] NZLR 
13. Both cases were decided without any 
reference to any rule of court or statutory 
provision. 
Meikle v New Zealand Times Co (1904) 23 NZLR 
6893. 
103 
104 
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defence. This plea has its origins in the 
inherent jurisdi ction . 103 However sometimes 
it may not be available and the court must 
resort to its general power to prevent abuse 
of process. A leading case is that of 
Hunter v Chief Constable of the West 
Midlands Police. 104 This is a House of Lords 
decision that is often cited by New Zealand 
courts. It concerned members of the Irish 
Republican Army who were serving life 
sentences for their alleged roles in a 
bombing campaign. They had been convicted 
on the basis of confessions they claimed 
were forced from them by police violence. 
They then brought a civil action against the 
police. 
courts 
The action was struck out in the 
below and the House of Lords 
dismissed their appeal with the leading 
speech being given by Lord Diplock. The 
main reason for the decision was that a 
civil action cannot be used to attack the 
decision of a criminal court of competent 
jurisdiction unless a major piece of 
K Mason "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the 
Court" 57 ALJ 449,451. 
(1982] AC 529. 
105 
106 
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evidence has been uncovered since the 
criminal trial. The "dominant purpose" 
105 of 
the action was seen to be to disturb the 
original finding and thereby put pressure on 
the Home Office to release the plaintiffs 
from their life sentences. From the fact 
that the plaintiffs had failed to seek 
judgment against the Home Office for 
assaults by prison officers (which had been 
admitted by the Home Office), it was 
apparent that the plaintiffs were not really 
interested in damages. The "public 
scandal 11 106 a contrary decision would create 
was also mentioned. In this decision we see 
the Court looking to criteria that goes 
beyond its authority to administer justice 
in the proceedings before it. The main 
ground for the decision was the respect one 
must have for the previous decisions of 
other courts which is quite a different 
matter, although one can appreciate the 
necessity to ensure that court decisions can 
only be attacked by way of appeal and not by 
another set of proceedings. 
Above n104,541 
Above n104,542. 
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53 
inherent jurisdiction does not support such 
an approach according to Woodhouse J. Lord 
Diplock also hinted at an "improper purpose" 
ground on which to dismiss proceedings and 
seemed to think the public image of the 
House of Lords was a proper ground on which 
to exercise the inherent jurisdiction. 
The improper purpose approach also seemed to 
come through in the criminal case of Amery 
v Solicitor General. 107 This case concerned 
the "Rainbow Warrior" saboteurs, Alain 
Ma fart and Dominique Prieur. They were 
about to depart for Hao Atoll in accordance 
with the arbitration of the Secretary 
General of the United Nations which had been 
an attempt to solve the international 
dispute resulting from the heavy sentences 
imposed by the New Zealand High Court upon 
French agents acting under orders. Mr 
Amery attempted to prevent this by charging 
the two agents with minor summary offences 
based on the same incident. The Solicitor-
General stayed the proceeding. Mr Amery 
then brought an application for review of 
(1987] 2 NZLR 292. 
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his decision. 
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The Court of Appeal agreed 
with the High Court that this application 
should be struck out as the charges were an 
abuse of process. The Court purported to 
base its decision on the principle that to 
lay charges lesser than those which have 
already been prosecuted and which are based 
on the same facts is an abuse of process. 
This may be true, however the ground is 
stated so bluntly and without elaboration 
that one cannot help but think that it is a 
distaste for the alleged use of the courts 
by the plaintiff to achieve political ends 
that is the primary basis for the decision. 
This II improper purpose II ground is open to 
question. If a party has a real legal 
claim, what right does the court have to 
deny that party its right to enforce its 
claim merely because the court dislikes the 
motive behind the proceedings? The result 
of this case was the one required in the 
public interest but this does not mean the 
inherent jurisdiction could support it. Mr 
Amery was attempting to bring about what he 
perceived as the just result. Was it not 
the Court of Appeal that was acting with 
2 
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political motives in this case? However as 
a general rule it cannot be denied that to 
charge someone with regard to an incident 
for which that person has already served 
their sentence is oppressive and will be 
rightly dismissed as an abuse of the court 
process. 
Criminal litigation 108 
According to Lord Devlin in Connelly v Director 
of Public Prosecutions 10
9 
"Nearly the whole of the ... criminal law of 
procedure and evidence has been made by the 
exercise of the judges of their power to see 
that what was fair and just was done between 
prosecutors and accused.". 
His Lordship was of the opinion that the pleas of 
autrefois acquit and autrefois convict and the 
Judges Rules owe their existence to the inherent 
jurisdiction. 110 The major power we will consider 
Important cases dealing with the court's 
power to prevent abuses of its process not 
mentioned here include R v Davis [ 1982] 1 
NZLR 584; ~ v Moore [1974] 1 NZLR 417, and 
in the civil context Tamworth Industries Ltd 
v Attorney General Unreported, 26 June 1987, 
Court of Appeal 181/86. 
Above n63. 
Above n63,1348. 
111 
11 2 
113 
114 
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here is the general one to dismiss prosecutions 
as an abuse of process when the pleas mentioned 
above do not apply. The court's power to do 
this was finally established by the House of 
Lords in Connelly V Director of Public 
Prosecutions 111 and the Queen's Bench Division in 
Mills v Cooper. 112 
The thing that distinguishes this section from 
civil litigation is that criminal trials always 
involve a powerful party as the prosecutor and a 
weaker party as the defendant. The Court of 
Appeal has stated that fairness to the accused is 
an important consideration, "[b]ut the focus is 
on the misuse of the Court process by those 
responsible for law enforcement. ". 
113 
Prosecutions have been dismissed in the following 
situations: 
The police flagrantly breach the law in 
apprehending the accused. 
114 
Above n63. 
[ 1 9 6 7 ] 2 QB 4 5 9 . 
Moevao v Department of Labour [1980) 1 NZLR 
464,482 per Richardson J. 
R v Hartley [1978) 2 NZLR 199. 
115 
116 
57 
To be justified under the inherent jurisdiction 
the wider approach of Richmond J must be used to 
justify such a ground of dismissal as the reason 
for the dismissal has nothing to do with 
attaining the just result in the actual 
proceedings. 
The accused was charged and acquitted 
of an offence and then charged by the 
police with a closely related offence 
who use the same evidence as that used 
in the first trial. 11
5 
Again the wider approach of Richmond J has to be 
used to justify such a ground of dismissal under 
the inherent jurisdiction, possibly on the ground 
of the injustice caused to the defendant by 
having to undergo two trials. 
The police entice the accused to commit 
an offence he or she would not 
otherwise have committed. 
116 
This ground of dismissal is definitely 
justifiable under the inherent jurisdiction as it 
leads to the just result in the proceedings. 
Bryant v Collector of Customs [1984] 1 NZLR 
280; Ferris v Police [1985) 1 NZLR 314. 
Police v Lavalle (1979) 1 NZLR 45; R v 
Loughlin (1982] 1 NZLR 236. 
11 7 
118 
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The police charge the accused in breach 
of an agreement they had previously 
made with the accused . 11 7 
The wider approach to the inherent jurisdiction 
is necessary to justify this ground of dismissal 
as the II just II result ( in the narrowest sense) 
would be to convict the accused, as the accused 
was guilty of the offence. It is a wider idea 
of justice that leads to the conclusion that the 
prosecution should be dismissed. 
The prosecuting authorities delay the 
prosecution unreasonably. 118
 
Again the wider approach to the inherent 
jurisdiction is necessary to justify this ground 
of dismissal as the accused does not become any 
less guilty (if he or she is guilty at all) due 
to the delay by the prosecuting authorities. But 
the wider idea of justice leads to the conclusion 
that it is more important to alleviate the 
prejudice suffered by the accused because of the 
delay, than the public interest in the 
prosecution of the accused. 
Delellis v Police Unreported, 25 September 
1989, High Court Auckland Registry. 
Russell v Stewart Unreported, 29 September 
1988, High Court Auckland Registry AP153/87; 
Watson v Clarke Unreported, 12 October 1988, 
High Court Dunedin Registry AP55/88 . 
11 9 
120 
121 
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In exercising their power to dismiss prosecutions 
as an abuse of process the New Zealand judiciary 
seem to be consistently acting in a way that is 
not supportable by the inherent jurisdiction 
according to the approach of Woodhouse J . 
Therefore it is the opposing view that holds 
sway. I submit that this approach h a s resulted 
in a satisfactory situation. None of the 
examples mentioned above seem unreasonable in any 
way. 
Other factors that will be considered by the 
court in deciding whether to dismiss the 
prosecution include the public interest in the 
fair use of the court's process 
119, promoting 
public confidence in the administration of 
justice 120 , preventing the police prosecuting 
people for ulterior purposes. 
121 These 
Moevao v Department of Labour (1980) 1 NZLR 
464,481 per Richardson J; Bryant v 
Collector of Customs ( 1984] 1 NZLR 280,282 
per Richardson J; Re Arnold (1977) 1 NZLR 
327,336. 
Moevao v Department of Labour [1980) 1 NZLR 
464,482 per Richardson J; Bryant v 
Collector of Customs (1984) 1 NZLR 280,282 
per Richardson J . 
Moevao v Department of Labour [1980) 1 NZLR 
464,482 per Richardson J; Kumar v 
Immigration Department [1978) 2 NZLR 553,558 
122 
123 
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considerations are all balanced by the public 
interest in punishing those who breach the laws 
of the land. 122 These principles are far too 
broad to sit within the narrower analysis of the 
inherent jurisdiction advanced by Woodhouse J. 
It is obviously the broader approach that is 
currently preferred by the New Zealand judiciary. 
As is mentioned above, this approach seems to 
have resulted in quite a satisfactory situation. 
However, this again puts us in the position of 
having to rely on the judges to exercise their 
inherent jurisdiction responsibly instead of 
having the safeguard of a satisfactorily defined 
and limited inherent jurisdiction. 
Two limits to the power to dismiss prosecutions 
as an abuse of process can however be identified. 
The power cannot be exercised when the offence 
is an absolute one 123 or when the problem that 
occurs has nothing to do with the conduct of the 
per Richardson J. 
Bosch v Ministry of Transport [1979] 1 NZLR 
502,510. 
Moevao v Department of Labour (1980] 1 NZLR 
464,482 per Richardson J. 
61 
prosecuting authorities. 124 
III THE DISTRICT COURT 
In this section we will consider whether the District 
Court has an inherent jurisdiction and if not whether 
it has powers that arise elsewhere. 125 It is necessary 
to this point to briefly describe the District Court. 
It is called a II creature of statute II because it was 
created by the District Courts Act 194 7. In its 
civil jurisdiction powers are conferred on it by the 
1947 Act and the District Court Rules. In its 
criminal jurisdiction it enjoys the powers conferred 
by the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 . 
The controversy regarding the inherent jurisdiction in 
the District Court began with the statement of 
124 
125 
McMenamin v Attorney General (1985) 2 NZLR 
274,276 per Somers J. 
One such power is District Court Rule 7(2) 
which provides that if a situation arises 
which is not provided for by the District 
Courts Act 1947 or the District Court Rules 
the case should be dealt with according to 
any provisions of the same affecting a 
similar case, or if there is no such 
provision in accordance with the High Court 
Rules or, if there are no appropriate High 
Court Rules then in such a manner as the 
Court deems best calculated to promote the 
ends of justice . 
62 
Chilwell J in 197 8 in Henderson v The Police 
12 6 that, 127 
all Magistrates have inherent jurisdiction ... arising 
out of the control by them of their Courts and their 
procedures and their duty to ensure that Court 
procedure is not used to harass any individual. 
Soon after this, Somers J, then in the Supreme Court 
also indicated that the Magistrate's Court had an 
inherent jurisdiction, in Bosch v Ministry of 
Transport. 128 After this several High Court Judges went 
out of their way to assert that the District Court 
does not have an inherent jurisdiction but merely some 
inherent powers. 129 Two recent High Court decisions 
purport to clear the situation up. They are Russell 
v Stewart 130 a decision of Wylie J and Watson v Clarke 
131 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
Unreported, 24 February 1978, Supreme Court 
Dunedin Registry Mll / 78. 
Above n126,3. 
Above nl22. 
Rapana v The Police Unreported, 20 September 
1979, Supreme Court Invercargill Registry 
M87 / 79; Kettle v Basil Unreported, 28 
November 1979, Supreme Court Wellington 
Registry M558 / 79; Williams v Patterson & 
Pearson Unreported, 1 October 1980, High 
Court Masterton Registry M9 / 79; Attorney 
General v Bradford & McMenamin Unreported, 
25 October 1984, High Court Christchurch 
Registry A263 / 84; King v Blackwood & Wayman 
Unreported, 26 August 1985, High Court 
Auckland Registry A663/85. 
Unreported, 2 9 September 1988, High Court 
Auckland Registry AP153 / 87. 
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a decision of Robertson J - both decided in late 1988. 
They are both summary criminal cases and the crux of 
both decisions is that the Di strict Court Judge in 
each case did have the power to do what he did namely 
dismiss the charges due to the delay caused by the 
prosecution. However both Judges made strong obiter 
statements about the question before us . Wylie J 
prefaced his judgment in the following way after 
identifying the issues before him: 1
32 
131 
132 
Before embarking on a consideration of these two 
distinct questions it is desirable to endeavour 
to distinguish between "inherent jurisdiction" 
and "inherent power" . The summary criminal 
jurisdiction of the District Court is conferred 
on that Court by section 9 of the Summary 
Proceedings Act 1957. The District Court itself 
is constituted by the District Courts Act 1947 
and its jurisdiction in both civil and criminal 
matters is exclusively statutory. There is 
nothing in either statute to compare with section 
16 of the Judicature Act 1908 in relation to the 
High Court or sections 4 to 6 of the Supreme 
Court Act 18 60 from which the High Court has 
Unreported, 12 October 1988, High Court 
Dunedin Registry APSS / 88 . 
Above nl30,4. 
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derived the jurisdiction which the Superior 
Courts in England had at that time. So, in the 
strict sense, the District Court has no inherent 
jurisdiction. That does not mean to say 
however, that it does not have inherent powers. 
Robertson J paraphrased this in the following way: 
133 
The Learned Judge made the distinction between 
"inherent power" and "inherent jurisdiction". 
The former connotes an original and universal 
jurisdiction not derived from any other source, 
whereas the latter connotes an implied power such 
as the power to prevent abuse of process, which 
is necessary for the due administration of 
justice under powers already conferred. Thus the 
High Court has an inherent jurisdiction as 
confirmed by section 16 of the Judicature Act 
1908 whereas the District Court has a inherent 
power within that jurisdiction as conferred by 
statute. It is not an inherent jurisdiction but 
a power which exists within that statutory 
jurisdiction. 
Two questions arise: 
133 Above n131,9. To make sense of this passage 
"former II must be read as "latter" and vice 
versa. 
65 
( 1) If this view is correct what are the inherent 
powers of the District Court? 
(2) Is this view correct in light of (a) principle; 
and (b) authority? 
A The Inherent Powers of the District Court 
134 
First we should make it clear what powers the 
District Court definitely does have. For the 
moment we will assume that the District Court 
does have inherent powers only. The Court of 
Appeal in McMenamin v Attorney General confirmed 
the existence of two powers 134 : 
An inferior Court has the right to do what 
is necessary to enable it to exercise the 
functions, powers and duties conferred on it 
by statute. This is implied as a matter of 
statutory construction. Such Court al so 
has the duty to see that its process is used 
fairly. It is bound to prevent an abuse of 
that process. All this is well understood. 
See eg Moevao v Department of Labour 
[1980]1NZLR 464; New Zealand Social Credit 
Political League Inc v O'Brien [1984]1NZLR 
84; and Bryant v Collector of Customs (1984] 
lNZLR 280. The latter case and Bosch v 
Above n124. 
132 
133 
13 4 
135 
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Ministry of Transport [1979] lNZLR 502 were 
both concerned with inferior Courts. 
The duty to prevent an abuse of process must be 
an "inherent power" of the District Court. The 
power to do what is necessary in order to 
exercise its statutory functions is obviously not 
an inherent power but a result of statutory 
construction. 
The other three recognised inherent powers are 
as follows: 
1. To regulate the proceedings of the Court: 
Clifford v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 13
2
; 
2. To correct an incorrect record (as we have 
seen) : Salaman V Chesson 133 • I Rolton V 
Seeman 13 4; 
3. Power to change a judgment until it has been 
sealed: Re A' s Application for Legal Aid 13
5
• 
These powers come under the heading of ensuring 
convenience and fairness in legal proceedings. 
[1966] NZLR 201,203. This power is 
collateral to District Court Rule 7(3) which 
empowers every District Court Judge to make 
rules for the conduct of proceedings in his 
or her court. 
Above n57. 
Above n58. 
Above n46. 
B 
136 
137 
138 
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67 
It has also been suggested that the District 
Court may in a summary trial be able to determine 
as a preliminary question, the accused's rights 
under the Official Information Act 1982, by-
passing the procedure of that Act. 136 
It is also quite certain that the District Court 
does not have the power to punish for out of 
court contempt because it is simply one of the 
powers of the High Court to do this on behalf of 
the District Court 137• 
Principle 
To deal with this question we must go back to 
Jacob. His analysis came down to the idea that 
the inherent jurisdiction has no "source" as 
such. It simply exists as a fundamental 
attribute of what he called a "superior court of 
law" 138 _ As we have seen the District Court is 
an inferior court by definition 139 • The inherent 
jurisdiction exists because the judiciary have 
the authority to uphold, to protect and to fulfil 
Pearce v Thompson Unreported, Court of 
Appeal 37 / 85. 
Above n88. 
Above n3,27. 
Judicature Act 1908,s . 2. 
140 
141 
14 2 
14 3 
68 
the judicial function of administering justice 
according to law in a regular, orderly and 
effective manner. 140 
have this authority? 
How do we know that they 
Apparently because it is 
unthinkable that they do not. 
When Jacob specifically considered inferior 
courts he observed that the inferior courts of 
England exercise inherent jurisdiction, but he 
suspected that the power was derived from 
statute. 141 This view is at variance with the 
opinion of the English Court of Appeal in R v 
Bloomsbury & Marylebone County Court, Ex parte 
Villerwest Ltd. 14 2 That the County Court has an 
inherent jurisdiction merely because it requires 
it was made obvious in the judgment of Lord 
Denning MR 14 3 and Roskill LJ who said that "a 
county court judge has an inherent jurisdiction, 
Above n3,28. 
The County Courts Act 1959,s.103 provides: 
"In any case not expressly provided for by 
or in pursuance of this Act, the general 
principles of practice in the High Court may 
be adopted and applied to proceedings in a 
county court.". 
[1976] 1 WLR 362. 
Above n145,365. 
144 
145 
14 9 
150 
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for it is necessary for him to possess it in 
order to do justice between the parties ... 11 • 
144 
K Mason provides an Australian viewpoint: 14 5 
[O]ne would have thought that inferior 
courts would have as wide an inherent 
jurisdiction as that of superior courts. 
After all, 11 'inherent jurisdiction' is the 
power which a court has simply because it is 
a court of a particular description, [it] is 
not something derived by implication from 
statutory provisions conferring particular 
jurisdiction u'l't- Judges of inferior courts 
should have the same concern to prevent 
abuses, delays and injustices as judges of 
superior courts . Generally speaking, the 
authorities support these propositions. 
These authorities include Overton v Loukides 
14 9
, 
R v Rawson; Ex parte Moore 150 and Boge ta Pty Ltd 
Above nl45,366. 
K Mason "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the 
Court" 57 ALJ 449,456. Footnote 94 reads 
"Menzies J in R v Forbes; Ex parte Bevan 
(1972) 127 CLR l,at 7 11 • 
[1970) VR 462,465. 
[1976) Qd.R. 138,143. 
151 
152 
153 
154 
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v Wales 151 
SA Cohen provides an in depth Canadian analysis 
of this question in the particular context of 
abuse of process. 152 He argued that a provision 
of the Canadian Criminal Code bestowed the 
inherent jurisdiction upon inferior courts. 
However he also argued that if that provision did 
not exist they would not have inherent 
jurisdiction. He described the sentiment that 
any court must be able to prevent an abuse of its 
process as "laudable" 153 but was unable to agree 
that it was the case. His problem was that he 
could not see any "legal basis" 154 for ascribing 
an inherent jurisdiction to inferior courts. 
Cohen seems have been looking for a legal supply 
line between the superior courts of England and 
the inferior statutory courts of Canada or in 
other words a "source". However as we have seen 
the inherent jurisdiction does not have a source, 
it just exists as an inherent attribute of the 
(1977) 1 NSWLR 139. 
SA Cohen Due Process of Law (The Carswell 
Company Ltd, Toronto, 1977). 
Above n152,397. 
Above n152,396. 
155 
156 
15 7 
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courts. To this Cohen would surely reply that it 
is only an inherent attribute of superior courts 
as "[t]he statutory court derives its powers and 
existence from statute while the superior court 
under our law has an essence which has been 
described as 'almost metaphysical •1q711 155 
Cohen mentioned the contrary argument of D W 
Roberts: 156 
In 
The argument is that once the doctrine has 
been developed it becomes part of the common 
law, by all of the courts - statutory and 
non-statutory; its origin is therefore 
unimportant. Common law principles form an 
important part of criminal trials and it is 
expected that all Courts will apply them, 
not just some of them. 
reply Cohen had this to say: 157 
Professor Roberts arguments have a certain 
appeal. But in asking us to ignore the 
origin of the doctrine he, in essence, is 
Above n149,395 . Footnote 197 reads: "D W 
Roberts, 'The Doctrine of Abuse of Process 
in Canadian Criminal Law' ( 19 7 2, Report of 
the First Annual Conference of the British 
Colombia Judges Association, 39 at p.46 . 
D W Roberts article, p47. 
Above nl52,397,398. 
158 
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urging upon us a situation involving moral 
justice, but not law. The very lifeblood of 
the doctrine is its origins in the inherent 
jurisdiction of superior courts. 
that link and you kill the doctrine. 
Sever 
This argument also has a II certain appeal 11 • 
However it is submitted that the inherent 
jurisdiction exists to serve the justice system 
and ultimately society as a whole. It is the 
servant and not the master. This seems to be 
the current attitude of the New Zealand courts 
to technical legal arguments cited by counsel in 
an attempt to hamstring the Court's ability to 
bring about a fair resolution of the dispute 
between the parties. This approach has recently 
been seen in the fields of administrative law 158 
See Bulk Gas Users Group v Attorney General 
(1983) NZLR 129 where the Court of Appeal 
decided it could review all findings of law 
by statutory tribunals even if they are 
questions within the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal. 
73 
and also in the law of evidence. 159 Once the High 
Court has recognised the existence of a power to 
stop justice being defeated it is surely 
preposterous to then withhold that power from the 
District Court, the forum where the majority of 
legal disputes in New Zealand are decided. The 
District Court is also the forum for the first 
instance trial which may lead to an appeal to the 
High Court. 
residing 
To have the inherent jurisdiction 
only in the appeal forum is 
unacceptable. Procedural remedies are necessary 
at the trial because the appeal may well be too 
late. 
C Inherent Jurisdiction and Inherent Powers 
159 
160 
161 
It was stated in Russell v Stewart 160 and Watson 
v Clarke 161 and a number of previous High Court 
See _g v Baker Unreported, 20 April 1989, 
Court of Appeal 27/89. If the judgment of 
Cooke Pin this case is followed the hearsay 
rule will be of no further practical effect. 
See also Busby v Thorn EMI Video Programmes 
Ltd [1984) 1 NZLR 461 where the rule that 
the judge in a criminal trial has absolute 
control over the evidence admitted in the 
trial, was compromised to permit a just 
result in a previous civil action. 
Above n130. 
Above nl 31. 
162 
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decisions that the District Court does not have 
an inherent jurisdiction but inherent powers. It 
is the possession of these inherent powers that 
explains why it can prevent an abuse of process, 
correct an incorrect record and change an 
unsealed judgment and yet not have an inherent 
jurisdiction. 
of questions. 
This distinction raises a number 
First, how can the District Court have inherent 
power to prevent an abuse of process and yet not 
have the other powers of the inherent 
jurisdiction that also exist to see that justice 
is done? The only answer seems to be that the 
District Court "really needs" this power and does 
not need the other powers quite so much. 
However this "degree of necessity" argument is 
quite out of place. 
jurisdiction must 
considered valid. 
All aspects of the inherent 
meet the same test to be 
This sort of reasoning 
certainly does seem to be taking place. It was 
seen in a statement by District Court Judge 
Gilbert in R v Vis 162 when the Judge was 
considering whether he had an inherent 
[1989] DCR 38. 
163 
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jurisdiction when sitting in a jury trial. He 
said: 163 
For my part, I accept that I have the same 
inherent jurisdiction as the High Court as 
in my view to effectively sit in this 
jurisdiction continually requires reference 
to such matters. 
If indeed a District Court Judge has inherent 
jurisdiction whenever it is necessary for him or 
her to have inherent jurisdiction, I submit that 
the Distr i ct Court has an unqualified inherent 
jurisdiction. In every example of the inherent 
jurisdiction we have looked at, the judge or 
judges exercising the power have said (or if they 
did not say, they surely would have said so if 
they had been asked) that what they were doing 
was "necessary" to further some end, be it 
justice in the proceedings or justice in a more 
general sense. If the Di strict Court has 
inherent jurisdiction whenever it is necessary 
for it to have inherent jurisdiction, then it has 
inherent jurisdiction to the same extent that the 
High Court does. 
Above n162,39. 
164 
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Another question is what precisely are the powers 
inherent in? The answer seems to be the 
District Court's statutory jurisdiction. In 
Kettle v Basil Jefferies J put it like this: 164 
It is clear law that the exercise of the 
Magistrate's Courts criminal jurisdiction is 
governed by the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 
and it follows that Act provides a complete 
code for dealing with informations laid 
within the terms of that Act and that except 
to the extent that it is necessary to enable 
it to act effectively within its 
jurisdiction, has no jurisdiction beyond 
that expressly or impliedly conferred by 
Statute, that is, the Court has no inherent 
jurisdiction. 
The first point to be made is that we are not 
told by the Judges who say this the basis on 
which they have decided that Parliament intended 
to provide a complete code. The second point is 
that this talk of powers necessary to enable the 
court to act effectively within its jurisdiction 
is precisely the same principle expressed by Lord 
Unreported, 28 November 1979, Supreme Court 
Wellington Registry M558/79. This 
statement was quoted with approval in King 
v Blackwood and Wayman Unreported, 26 August 
1985, High Court Auckland Registry A663/85. 
165 
166 
167 
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Morris in Connelly v Director of Public 
Prosecutions 165 which as we saw at the beginning 
is regarded as the classic judicial statement of 
the principle behind the inherent jurisdiction. 166 
Possibly it is the realisation of this point that 
has led some judges 167 to claim that Lord Morris 
was not talking about the inherent jurisdiction 
at all but the inherent powers of all courts. 
It follows that the entire power to prevent abuse 
of process is not part of the inherent 
jurisdiction either as we had always thought. 168 
I submit that this approach, if correct, rips 
away from the inherent jurisdiction its founding 
Above nl6. 
Above n3,27; above n152,361; K Mason 
Inherent Jurisdiction of Court" 57 
449,454. 
"The 
ALJ 
Above n 131, 4; King v Blackwood & 
Unreported, 26 August 1985, High 
Auckland Registry A663 / 85, p8. 
Wayman 
Court 
That the power to prevent abuse of process 
is part of the inherent jurisdiction is 
apparent from what Jacob, Mason and Cohen 
had to say and also see above n24,682; above 
n113,465 per Richmond J and 473 per 
Woodhouse J; Bryant v Collector of Customs 
[1984} 1 NZLR 280,282 per Richardson J; 
Daly v Ministry of Transport [ 1983] NZLR 
736,742; Reid v New Zealand Trotting 
Conference [ 1984 J 1 NZLR 8, 9; New Zealand 
Social Credit Political League Inc v O'Brien 
[1984) 1 NZLR 84,96; above n27,48; Re 
Arnold [1977) 1 NZLR 327,331,333. 
169 
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principle and a substantial portion of the powers 
that have been exercised under it. If the 
Judges of the High Court are going to persist 
with this line of reasoning they will need to 
totally redefine the inherent jurisdiction 
instead of just talking about it as if we all 
know what it means. 
I submit with all due respect, that the Judges of 
the High Court have become confused by the term 
"inherent jurisdiction" itself. Lord Morris ' 
talk of powers inherent within the jurisdiction 
of the court 169 have simply become shortened to the 
term "inherent jurisdiction", and there has been 
no change of meaning. 
Another problem with this reasoning is as 
follows. For the moment we will assume that 
the basis for the inherent powers of the District 
Court is the principle that all courts have the 
power necessary to act effectively within their 
An example of an early description of the 
inherent jurisdiction in these terms is 
provided by Lord Selbourne LC in 
Metropolitan Bank v Pooley (above nll,220): 
11 The power seemed to be inherent in the 
jurisdiction of every court of justice to 
protect itself from the abuse of its own 
procedure . ". 
170 
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jurisdiction. However if a District Court Judge 
is faced with a grave danger that the defendant 
in a civil case may destroy vital evidence, for 
the Court to be able to act effectively within 
its jurisdiction it must be able to grant an 
Anton Piller order. The same reasoning would 
apply to every example of the inherent 
jurisdiction that we have looked at. The 
logical conclusion of the High Court's reasoning 
is that the District Court has inherent 
jurisdiction as we understand it. I say again, 
the vital question is what the High Court means 
by "inherent jurisdiction". 
The criticisms do not end there. The inherent 
powers of the District Court are said to be 
narrower than the inherent jurisdiction because 
the inherent powers are tied to the Court's 
t , , d , t , 17 0 statu ory Juris 1c ion. If this does not mean 
the powers are necessary to exercise the 
statutory jurisdiction effectively, it must mean 
that they are necessary to enable specific powers 
conferred by statute to be exercised. However 
Attorney General v Bradford & McMenamin 
Unreported, 25 October 1984, High Court 
Christchurch Registry A263/84,p8; Watson v 
Clarke (above n131,9). 
D 
171 
172 
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our definitive statement from McMenamin V 
Attorney General 171 shows that this is not inherent 
power but a matter of statutory construction. 
So we are still lacking a satisfactory conceptual 
description of the District Court's inherent 
powers. We know the inherent powers go beyond 
the power to prevent an abuse of process but have 
no idea where they stop or how the preconditions 
for the exercise of them differ from the 
preconditions to the exercise of the inherent 
jurisdiction . 
District Courts Act 1947, Section 42 
Cohen ' s final conclusion was that even though in 
principal an inferior statutory court does not 
have inherent jurisdiction a provision of the 
Canadian Criminal Code conferred inherent 
jurisdiction upon the inferior courts of Canada. 172 
In my opinion the District Courts Act 1947,s.42 
plays the same role in New Zealand but only in 
civil proceedings. It reads as follows: 
Above n124. 
The Canadian Criminal Code, s. 40 "Every judge 
or magistrate has the same power and 
authority to preserve order in a court over 
which he presides as may be exercised by the 
superior court of criminal jurisdiction of 
the province during the sittings thereof.". 
173 
174 
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A judge shall have jurisdiction in any 
proceedings pending to make any order or to 
exercise any authority or jurisdiction 
which, if it related to an action or 
proceeding pending in the High Court, might 
be made or exercised by a judge of the High 
Court in Chambers. 
This provision does not apply to the criminal 
jurisdiction of the District Court by virtue of 
s.2(2) of the same Act. 
Section 42 was used to obtain a Mareva injunction 
in the Auckland District Court in Western Motors 
Ltd v Noakes 173 • As we have seen a Mareva 
injunction is one of the most radical and drastic 
creations of the inherent jurisdiction. 
The section was also invoked in the case of 
Cooper-Smith v Menner 174 which involved a personal 
injury action. The Defendant applied for an 
order that the Plaintiff undergo a medical 
Unreported, July 1981, Auckland District 
Court. 
6 MCD 186. 
175 
176 
177 
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examination which is one of the powers of the 
inherent jurisdiction. 175 The order was granted. 
A caveat is provided by the case of Hata v Hata 176 
which held that s.42 is overridden by statutory 
provisions that specifically confer a certain 
jurisdiction on the High Court. 177 
The vital question is however what are the powers 
of "a Judge of the High Court in Chambers"? 
The answer at present is provided by High Court 
Rules 234 and 3. Rule 234 deals with 
interlocutory applications. It says: 
Every interlocutory application shall be 
made by motion to the Court and shall be 
heard in Chambers unless the Court otherwise 
directs. 
Therefore section 42 applies to all interlocutory 
applications. 
application? 
What is an interlocutory 
Rule 3 says it means, 
Edmeades v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1969] 2 
QB 67. 
11 MCD 222. 
The provision in question empowered the 
Supreme Court to state a case for the Maori 
Appellate Court. 
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any application to the Court in any 
proceeding or intended proceeding for an 
order or direction relating to a matter of 
procedure or for some relief ancillary to 
that claimed in a pleading. 
Therefore section 42 applies to all matters of 
procedure and applications fo r ancillary relief. 
The conclusion must be that the District Court 
has an inherent jurisdiction in civil proceedings 
subject to the requirement in Rule 3 that there 
by an application by one of the parties. 
IV CONCLUSION 
The first part of this paper dealt with Jacob's 
analysis in the hope of revealing a principled view of 
the inherent jurisdi ction, a view that had definable 
limits and a reasonably specific central rationale. 
Such a view may have been threatened even in the very 
next section when the respective approaches of the 
House of Lords in Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video 
Information Centre 178 and the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal in Busby v Thorn EMI Video Programmes Ltd 179 
were contrasted . The learned President of the Court 
178 
179 
Above nl8. 
Above n19. 
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of Appeal openly asserted a "wider" 180 inherent 
jurisdiction than that assumed by the House of Lords 
and then proceeded to override one of the most basic 
principles of our procedural law, namely the trial 
judge's absolute control over the evidence submitted 
in his or her court, all to allow the controversial 
device of the Anton Piller order (itself a creation of 
the inherent jurisdiction) to retain its 
effectiveness. The suspicion that the inherent 
jurisdiction was beginning to break out of Jacob' s 
conceptual bounds was confirmed in the next section 
which covered the inherent jurisdiction to ensure 
convenience and fairness in legal proceedings. That 
revealed a wide ranging arsenal of powers that could 
not be boiled down any further than Lne wording of the 
heading. Indeed the High Court felt free to exercise 
the powers whenever it would promote convenience and 
fairness. The only judge who attempted to get us 
back to first principles (quoting Master Jacob in the 
process 181 ) was Woodhouse J in Taylor v Attorney 
180 
181 
Above n19,471. 
Jacob' s statement was as follows: "The 
juridical basis of this jurisdiction is 
therefore the authority of the judiciary to 
uphold, to protect and to fulfil the 
judicial function of administering justice 
ac~ording to law in a regular, orderly and 
effective manner." (above n3,27,28). 
General. 182 
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It must be said that the approach of 
Woodhouse J is even narrower than that of Jacob, who 
based his view on the idea of the court maintaining 
its authority to administer justice. If Jacob had 
added the words "in the proceedings before the court", 
only then would his analysis truly be as narrow as 
that of Woodhouse J. Of course Woodhouse J was 
overruled by the majority of the Court of Appeal which 
stuck with the broader criteria of Richmond J. 
The section dealing with Mareva injunctions and Anton 
Piller orders may have been a little more reassuring 
in one sense as the remedies are prime examples of the 
court asserting its authority to do justice in the 
case before it, refusing to allow one party to render 
the proceedings useless . However the remedies do 
reveal the awesome inventive power of the inherent 
jurisdiction and cause us to realise the effects of 
the inherent jurisdiction on the structure of our law 
and on the individual liberties of prospective 
defendants. In fact we may have preferred Parliament 
to have created these remedies instead of the courts, 
as Parliament would have been able to comprehensively 
regulate the area. At present, things develop on a 
case by case basis which is much less satisfactory. 
182 Above n24. 
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The section dealing with the courts general power over 
its officers and over minors severely challenged our 
principled view of the inherent jurisdiction. The 
decision in Re C (A Solicitor) 183 and court's power of 
wardship seem to be matters of substantive law, and 
they certainly knock a hole in our Jacobean view of 
the inherent jurisdiction. 
The section dealing with the High Court's power over 
inferior courts is a less controversial one. However 
it did foreshadow the single major problem area dealt 
with in this paper, namely the inherent jurisdiction 
(or lack of it) in the District Court. 
In the abuse of process section we saw how the court 
could refuse to hear proceedings it considered not 
worthy of the court's time. The cases of Hunter v 
Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police 184 and Amery 
v Solicitor General 185 showed that the courts will look 
to the real purpose behind litigation and can stay the 
proceeding even is there is a real legal claim 
involved. 
183 
18 4 
185 
Also proceedings can be dismissed to 
[1982] 1 NZLR 137. 
Above n104. 
Above n107. 
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ensure that respect for previous court decisions i
s 
preserved. Possibly the best way to justify thes
e 
cases under inherent jurisdiction theory is tha
t 
people must be discouraged from using litigation to
 
re-open matters that have already been settled by 
a 
court. This will prevent the oppression an
d 
injustice that would be suffered by the other party. 
The criminal cases in which prosecutions wer
e 
dismissed as an abuse of process again demonstrate
d 
that the courts will look to much more than merely the
 
correct determination of the substantive issues in the
 
proceedings. In this area, the courts primarily se
e 
the inherent jurisdiction as a device with which they
 
can control the behaviour of the police, in the public
 
interest. 
Then the paper moved on to consider the question o
f 
the inherent jurisdiction in the District Court. Th
e 
weight of authority is firmly of the view that th
e 
District Court does not have an inherent jurisdiction
 
but inherent powers. However, I argued th
at the 
District Court should have inherent jurisdiction o
n 
basic principles and on 
attempted to show that 
policy 
the 
grounds. I also 
jurisdiction/powers 
distinction is a logically unsustainable one and tha
t 
if we are going to say the District Court has the
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inherent power to prevent abuse of its process we must 
admit that it has inherent jurisdiction. Our only 
alternative is to say that it has no power to prevent 
the abuse of its process. The assertion that the 
doctrine of abuse of process is not even part of the 
inherent jurisdiction is quite unsustainable. 
My final point was that if all I had previously argued 
regarding the inherent jurisdiction of the District 
Court had been wrong the inherent jurisdiction of the 
High Court is conferred on the District Court in 
respect of civil proceedings by the District Courts 
Act 1947,s.42 . This assertion is supported by the 
decisions in Western Motors Ltd v Noakes 
186 and in 
Cooper-Smith v Menner 
187
• 
Finally, we should attempt to answer the questions 
with which we began. First, where does the inherent 
jurisdiction come from? The answer seems to be, from 
the very essence of the court itself. To ensure that 
the New Zealand courts were seen to contain this basic 
attribute as well as the English courts, Parliament 
enacted section 16 of the Judicature Act 1908. 
186 Above nl 72 . 
187 Above nl 73. 
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Second, what is it used to achieve? We have 
discussed a number of different possible answers to 
this question. Woodhouse J said the aim has to be 
justice in relation to the result of the actual 
proceedings. As has been made obvious throughout 
this paper, his position is a narrower one than many 
of the reported decisions. I submit, with respect, 
that this fact necessarily renders his opinion 
incorrect. The law is what the courts are in fact 
doing. 
doing? 
Who then best described what the courts are 
The approach of Richmond J was essentially 
that if you can perceive any way in which some sort of 
justice will result from the action the court takes, 
the action can be supported by the inherent 
jurisdiction. I submit that this proposition is able 
to justify every exercise of inherent jurisdiction we 
have looked at, with the exception of Re Jones 
(Deceased) 188 ( granting letters of administration) , but 
as this case was decided on the basis of the second 
part of the Judicature Act 1908,s.16, it may be 
irrelevant to the inherent jurisdiction anyway. Lord 
Morris' idea of the inherent jurisdiction as a set of 
powers to enable the court to use its general 
jurisdiction effectively is also a useful one. It 
also seems to justify every power we have looked at 
188 Above n4 7 . 
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and probably better describes what is actually going 
through a judge's mind when he or she contemplates an 
exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Jacob's concept 
of the court using its inherent jurisdiction to uphoJ.d 
its ability to administer justice in a regular, 
orderly and effective manner, was used by Woodhouse J 
as support for his narrow approach. However the 
support it lends is difficult to see. It really says 
that the court can do anything that will bring about 
justice. There is no limitation as to the kind of 
justice it can be and therefore seems to support 
Richmond J. 
Third, what are the limits to the inherent 
jurisdiction? At the beginning of this paper, we 
noted two principle limits. Namely that the inherent 
jurisdiction moves in the realm of the procedural law 
only and that it must not contravene statute or rules 
of court. The former limit severely dented our 
examination of the court's inherent jurisdiction to 
make a child a ward of court. The latter limit has 
appeared to hold al though it was pushed in Busby 
189 
in 
relation to the statutory provisions that in other 
contexts authorised exceptions to the privilege 
against self-incrimination and declared evidence 
189 Above nl 9. 
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obtained to be inadmissible in a subsequent criminal 
trial. The shakiness of this limit is shown by an 
example from the administrative law. The courts 
refuse to submit to privative clauses in the way 
Parliament obviously intended, and will interpret them 
so narrowly that they come to have almost no meaning. 
190 
If there ever does come a time when Parliament tries 
to stop the courts exercising their inherent 
jurisdiction in a certain way, and if the courts 
really feel it is important to keep exercising that 
power, it is not easy to predict which institution 
would eventually prevail. 
190 An i s mini c Ltd v _F_o_r_e_1_· g...,__n _ _:C-'o:...;::m-pi.:.....::.e..:.:n:...;::s:...;::a:.:..t=i-=o-=n 
:..:C.:..:o-=m-=m..:.:i.:..:.s_s-'--1-· o-n-....,.[--:-1--::9-::6 9 J 2 AC 1 6 6 . 
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